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Valuing employee stock 
options is a lot more 
difficult than it sounds. 
It helps to remember that 
employee options and market-
traded options are quite different. 
The difference between them 
makes valuing employee opt ions 
more complicated, but it also offers a lesson about how 
the employer's cost for a given piece of the total rewards 
package may not be the same as its value to a given 
employee. Organizations too often miss this and, as a result , 
can find themselves leaving money on the table. 
Market-Traded Options 
A stock option is the right to buy a share of stock at a 
specific price (called the strike or exercise price) at some 
point in the future. A market-traded option Gill be bought 
and sold in open markets (just like actual stock or commodi-
ties). To put a dollar value on an option bought and so ld 
in the financial markets , one only need know six pieces of 
information: strike price ; current stock price ; volatility of the 
stock; time until expiration; risk-free rate of interest; and 
dividend rate. Four decades ago, pioneering ,vork by Fisher 
Black and Myron Scho les c·The Pricing of Options and 
Corporate Liabilities ,'' Joumal of Political Eco110111y, May-
June, 1973) and Robert . Merton (''The Theory of Rational 
Option Pricing, .. Bel/Jo11mal ojh'conomics and /lla11aReme11t 
Science, 4, Spring 1973) set off an extraordinary industry in 
options and other derivative trading. Merton and Scholes 
won the obel Prize in economics in 1997 for their research 
on derivatives pricing , and the Black-Scholes equation is 
ubiquitous when discussing stock options. 
The tricky part is that the employee options are not 
market traded and may not fit all the technical assump-
tions underpinning the Black-Scholes equation. These 
assumptions range from straightforward (the individual can 
buy and sell at will) to more technical assumptions . The 
important thing is that the Black-Scholes equation wasn 't 
created to pul a dollar value on employee options within 
the total rewards package. Valuing employee options 
needs to be done, but trying to do so carefully introduces 
new complications. 
...., lo •ee Stock Opt ons Are o·-- t 
For some time , researchers have understood that pnc111g 
employee options is different from pricing market-traded 
options. In market-traded options , traders are risk-neutral , 
meaning they neither seek thrill in taking investment risks 
(think skydiver) nor fear risk , and their portfolios are 
diversified. But employees who hold options are neither 
risk-neutral nor diversified with regard to their options, 
and these facts and others make the valuation of employee 
options more difficult. 
This is an issue that economi .sls have been working on 
for some time. Some researchers, including Richard A. 
Lambert, David f. Larcker and Rohen E. erecchia ("Port-
folio Con ·ideration in Valuing Executive Compensation. " 
Joumal of Accounting Research , 29 , 1991) , recognized 
that employees making decisions about the value of their 
stock options probably shoulcln "t be thought of as risk -
neutral, diversified investors. Think about those who have 
a large fraction of their wealth tied to the company and 
are, therefore, not diversified in any real sense. Brian j. 
!Ja i l and Kevin j. Murphy ( "Srock Options for ncliversi-
fiecl Executives ," Journal of Acco1111tillg and Economics, 
33, 2002), tried to estimate the value employees place 
on options by making some technical assumptions about 
how employees value money in hand versus income in 
the future and what economists call " utility " (think , for 
example , of the different bundles of goods that would 
make a person or group equally well off). Hall and Murphy 
found that the executives they studied valued employee 
options at less than the Black-Scholes value . This seems a 
reasonable result because employees (who hold employee 
stock options) are risk-averse and uncliversifiecl while the 
Black-Scholes equation is designed for risk-neutral and 
diversified investors. 
AL sso -or Othe T peso- a 
It turns out that market-traded options are never exer-
cised until just before expiration. Therefore , if one wants 
money from a market-traded option , he/ she must sell it 
to someone else (and it would be foolish to exercise it 
the real world 
because there is still rime left on the option). On the other 
hand , an employee is barred from selling his / her options. 
To get money from employee options, he/ she must exer -
cise them. This marks an additional difference between 
market - traded and employee options . The former can be 
sold and are never exercised (except at the last moment) 
and the latter can't be sold and are frequently exercised 
long before they expire . 
In a recent paper I wrote with Craig A. Olson ( "New 
Data for Answering Old Questions Regarding Employee 
Stock Options ," Labor and The New Economy, Katharine G. 
Abraham, James R. Spletzer and Michael Harper , editors, 
ational Bureau of Economic Research , 2010), we tried to 
use this information and an additional fact to estimate the 
value employees place on options in a specific company. 
We reasoned that on any gi, ·en clay an employee option 
is not exercised , the employee must value the option by 
more than the intrinsic value (the difference between the 
stock price and the strike price). Say the strike price is 20 
and the current stock price is 27. If an employee held 
the option that day , she must value the option at more 
than the 7 intrinsic value. If she valued it less , she would 
have exercised the option and taken the 7. We use this 
idea and "use statistical analysis to follow" a few thousand 
employees each day over many years and estimate that the 
employees in that company at that time valued options at 
a level quite a bit above the outcome of the Black- choles 
valuation. So in this company, the employer cost (which 
turns out is the Black-Scholes value) is less than the value 
to the employee. So they should give more options in l ieu 
of cash. This may not be true at other companies and these 
have to be tested one at a time. 
This example is illustrative or a larger point. Many orga-
nizations don 't think carefully enough about the value 
employees place on different forms of compensation. Here 
we have a completely nonintrusive way to get a handle on 
the value employees place on compensation. It is easy lo 
compute employer cost , bur it rakes different thinking to 
elicit employee value . ~ 
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